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ABSTRACT
Katharine Jenkins argues that Sally Haslanger’s focal analysis of gender problematically
excludes non-passing trans women from the category “woman.” However, Jenkins does not
explain why this exclusion contradicts the feminist aims of Haslanger’s account. In this paper, I
advance two arguments that suggest that a trans-inclusive account of “woman” is crucial to the
aims of feminism. I claim that the aims of feminism are to understand and combat women’s
oppression. First, I argue that denial of trans identities reinforces cultural ideas that perpetuate
both transphobic violence and sexual violence against women. Consequently, a feminist account
of “woman” that fails to respect trans identities indirectly contributes to the oppression of
women. Second, I prove that non-passing trans women are oppressed as women through the
internalization of sexual objectification. I then conclude that an account of “woman” that
excludes non-passing trans women cannot successfully advance a complete understanding of
women’s oppression.
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Introduction
In “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?” Sally

Haslanger conducts a focal analysis of gender that is guided by the aims of critical feminist
discourse. Haslanger defines being a “woman” as being a member of a social class whose
unifying feature is social subordination based on one’s presumed or perceived female biological
role in reproduction. Because feminist discourse aims to develop an understanding of the
oppression of women, Haslanger does not think it problematic that her account excludes females
who are not socially subordinated.
However, in “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman,”
Katharine Jenkins argues that Haslanger’s focal analysis of gender problematically excludes nonpassing trans women from the category “woman.”1 Jenkins asserts that this exclusion of some
trans women from her account of “woman” is incompatible with the feminist aims guiding
Haslanger’s analytical inquiry. Jenkins claims that such exclusion marginalizes trans women
within feminist discourse, but she does not offer a satisfying account of why such
marginalization is problematic given the stated feminist aims of Haslanger’s account. In other
words, Jenkins does not satisfyingly rule out the possibility that Haslanger’s exclusion of some
trans women is defensible on the grounds that such trans women are not socially subordinated on
the basis of their presumed biological role in reproduction.
I will argue that creating a trans-inclusive definition of woman is crucial to feminist aims.
I start from the claim that the aims of feminism are to understand and combat women’s
oppression. I then advance two arguments for the inclusion of trans women (both passing and
non-passing) in a feminist account of “woman.” First, I argue that the political aim of
Throughout this paper, I use the phrase “non-passing trans women” to refer to those trans women who do not
“pass” as cis women. In contrast, the phrase “passing trans women” refers to trans women who do “pass” as cis
women. I will elaborate more on the phenomenon of passing in section II.
1
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feminism—the commitment to combatting the oppression of women—requires that a feminist
account of “woman” be trans-inclusive. I argue that feminism’s commitment to eradicating
women’s oppression is embedded within a broader commitment to bring about a more just
society. Using a definition of “woman” that marginalizes trans women is counterproductive to
this aim of feminism. In addition, I argue that denial of trans identities reinforces cultural
assumptions about the communicative nature of gender presentation. Insofar as these cultural
assumptions motivate and are used to justify transphobic violence and sexual violence against
women, an account of “woman” that fails to respect trans identities may perpetuate these
oppressive forms of violence.
Second, focusing specifically on the sexual objectification of women by cultural
stereotypes that results in women’s internalization of this objectification through adaptive
preferences, I argue that female gender identity is sufficient for trans women (passing and nonpassing) to experience the psychological forms of oppression that women face. Therefore,
because all trans women can be oppressed as women, a feminist account of “woman” that
excludes some trans women cannot fully serve the goal of feminist discourse—that is, advancing
an understanding of women’s oppression.
2

Background: Summary of Haslanger and Jenkins
Haslanger conducts a focal analysis of gender in order to create a definition that serves

the aims of critical feminist theory and avoids the commonality and normativity problems that
often obstruct attempts to define “woman.”2 The commonality problem refers to the worry that
there is no social feature or experience that all women share. The normativity problem involves
According to Haslanger, a focal analysis “explain[s] a variety of connected phenomena in terms of their relations
to one that is theorized as the central or core phenomenon” (228). Haslanger takes gender’s function as a social class
as the “core phenomenon” to be explained. All other aspects of gender—“norms, symbols, and identities”—are to be
understood through the lens of gender as a social class. Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They?
(What) Do We Want Them To Be?” in Resisting Reality (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012): 228.
2
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the recognition that any definition of woman has normative implications and may privilege some
women and marginalize others or may even further entrench patriarchal values of femininity.3
In order to generate a definition of “woman” that is guided by the interests of feminist
analysis and avoids the commonality and normativity problems, Haslanger creates an account of
“woman” in which being a woman involves being a member of a social class in which one is
systematically subordinated on the basis of (presumed) biological sex:
S is a woman iff
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain bodily
features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction;
that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S’s society as
someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social position that are in fact
subordinate (and so motivates and justifies S’s occupying such a position); and
the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S’s systematic subordination, that
is, along some dimension, S’s social position is oppressive, and S’s satisfying (i)
and (ii) plays a role in that dimension of subordination.4

Haslanger claims that her focal account of woman avoids the commonality and normativity
problems because it is an analytical account that focuses on subordinate social positions as the
feature that women share.5 Further, while Haslanger admits that some non-oppressed females
may not count as women on her account, she claims that this is not problematic insofar as the
account is intended to facilitate critical feminist analysis: “The important issue is not whether a
particular account ‘marginalizes’ some individuals, but whether its doing so is in conflict with
the feminist values that motivate the inquiry.”6
Before offering an account of why this marginalization is problematic, a few comments
about “passing” might be helpful. A trans woman “passes” when she is perceived to be a woman
3

Haslanger, 228.
Haslanger, 234. Emphasis in the original.
5
Haslanger, 240.
6
Ibid. When Haslanger claims that some non-oppressed females may not be counted as women, she means women
who are privileged socially, politically, and economically such that they cannot be considered members of a
subordinated social class. Later, in the PEA Soup discussion of Jenkins’ paper, Haslanger acknowledges that her
account fails to capture all the individuals that feminism ought to be concerned about (i.e. trans women).
4
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by those around her. Specifically, the term “passing” applies to contexts in which others observe
or imagine a trans woman to have “bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s
biological role in reproduction.”7 Following the spirit of Haslanger’s definition, I will call
“passing” those trans women who are perceived to be women “regularly and for the most part”
and “non-passing” those trans women who are not perceived to be women “regularly and for the
most part.”
Jenkins argues that Haslanger’s account of “woman” problematically excludes some trans
women from the category of woman. Specifically, Haslanger’s account excludes trans women
who are non-passing. Jenkins details four scenarios in which a trans woman may find herself: (1)
a trans woman who does not publicly present as a woman and is perceived and treated as a man
by those around her; (2) a trans woman who presents as a woman but who is perceived and
treated as a man (or, further, a man pretending to be a woman); (3) a trans woman who presents
as a woman and is treated as a woman because she is thought to be biologically female (i.e. she
is “passing”); (4) a trans woman who presents as a woman and is treated as a woman, not
because she is perceived to be biologically female but rather because those around her
unconditionally respect individuals’ gender presentation.8 On Haslanger’s account, only trans
women in scenario 3 would count as women. The trans woman who finds herself in Jenkins’s
scenarios 1 and 2 is not passing at that time and consequently is not functioning as a woman.
Jenkins explicitly states, but does not explain or defend, that the exclusion of some trans
women from Haslanger’s account is problematic, given the feminist aims of her inquiry:
Failure to respect the gender identifications of trans people is a serious harm and is
conceptually linked to forms of transphobic oppression and even violence. It follows
from this that an important desideratum of a feminist analysis of gender concepts is that it
7

Haslanger, 234-35.
Katharine Jenkins, “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman,” Ethics 126 (2016):
399-401.
8
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respect these identifications by including trans people within the gender categories with
which they identify and not including them within any categories with which they do not
identify.9
After demonstrating this alleged flaw in Haslanger’s account, Jenkins tries to repair the account
by adding gender identity as a twin target concept with Haslanger’s gender as social class. 10
Although I agree with Jenkins’ claim, she fails to show why the harms and oppressions that trans
people face necessitate that a feminist analysis of gender ought to be trans-inclusive.
In light of Haslanger’s account, it seems that non-passing trans women are not socially
subordinated as women “regularly and for the most part” because they are not perceived to be
women “regularly and for the most part.” Because the aim of Haslanger’s account is to develop a
definition of “woman” that allows feminist analysis to treat women as a group because of their
shared experience of oppression, it is important that anyone who is counted as a woman under
her account is oppressed as a woman. Thus, in order for Jenkins’ revision of Haslanger’s account
to be faithful to the original aims of the account, it must be the case that sexist subordination is a
systematic and pervasive element of the experience of non-passing trans women.
For the purposes of this paper, I will follow Haslanger and Jenkins and define the aims of
feminism broadly. On my view, the aims of feminism are to understand and combat women’s
oppression.11 It is based on this description of feminism’s goals that I will defend the claim that
developing an account of gender that respects trans identities is critical to the goals of feminism.

Jenkins, 396. It should be noted that, while Jenkins’ revision of Haslanger’s account solves the first problem that is
mentioned here (i.e. excluding some trans women from the category “woman”) it does not solve the second problem
of wrongful inclusion (i.e. including some trans women in the category “man”).
10
Jenkins, 406-413. Recall that Haslanger’s “focal analysis” takes gender’s function as a social class to be the “core
phenomenon” through which all other aspects of gender ought to be understood. In advocating a “twin target
concept,” Jenkins hopes to elevate gender as identity to have equal status with gender as social class, such that nonpassing trans women are not classified as women only in a secondary sense.
11
Haslanger claims that her focal analysis is guided by “The need to identify and explain persistent inequalities
between females and males,” which indicates an emphasis on the importance of understanding and explaining
women’s oppression (226; emphasis added). Similarly in “On Being Objective and Being Objectified,” Haslanger
claims: “If feminism is successful, there will no longer be a gender distinction as such—or, allowing that there are a
9
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Feminist Politics: Combatting Women’s Oppression
In this section, I argue that a definition of “woman” that excludes (some) trans women is

incompatible with the first aim of feminism—that is, combatting women’s oppression. In the
first subsection, I argue that feminism’s commitment to eradicating women’s oppression entails
an implicit commitment to avoid perpetuating or contributing to the oppression of others. I then
argue that failure to respect trans identities is itself unjust and, further, that it perpetuates the
oppression of trans individuals. Consequently, a definition of “woman” that fails to respect trans
identities is in tension with feminism’s implicit commitment to avoid perpetuating oppression.
In the second subsection, I argue that failing to respect trans identities contributes to the
oppression of women. Specifically, I argue that transphobic violence and sexual violence against
women are both motivated and justified by cultural assumptions about the communicative
relationship between gender presentation and sexual availability. I then argue that failing to
respect trans identities reinforces this cultural assumption and, in turn, perpetuates the oppression
of women. Consequently, a definition of “woman” that fails to respect trans identities is
incompatible with feminism’s commitment to eradicating women’s oppression.
3.1

A Commitment to Eradicating Societal Injustice
Although feminists have diverse views, all feminists hold that women are oppressed, that

oppression is unjust, and that women’s oppression must be ended. Given that feminists recognize
oppression as unjust and, hence, a serious moral wrong, they ought to avoid perpetuating or
contributing to the oppression of others in their attempts to end the oppression of women. This

plurality of relations that serve to constitute gender and a plurality of feminist projects, we can say that one goal of
feminism is to fight against the sexual subordination that constitutes these categories of men and women” (62).
Jenkins expresses a commitment to feminism’s political goal of ending women’s oppression in addition to echoing
the idea that it is first necessary to understand this oppression. This reasoning is revealed in Jenkins’ discussion of
how her modification of Haslanger’s account improves its explanatory power: “both gender as class and gender as
identity are relevant to understanding the oppression of women” (414).
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does not mean, however, that feminists ought to be committed to eradicating all forms of
oppression simultaneously. Rather, given their broader condemnation of oppression as a serious
moral wrong, feminists are implicitly committed to the idea that society would be improved if
there were fewer instances of oppression and injustice. That is, let us say that feminists view (or
ought to view) a more just society as their end. If they are (implicitly) committed to this claim,
then feminists ought not perpetuate injustice or oppression of any kind (whether directly or
indirectly). Such perpetuation of oppression and/or injustice would be morally indefensible for
the feminist who holds that oppression is a serious moral wrong. More importantly, however,
such perpetuation of oppression is in conflict with feminism’s implicit commitment to bringing
about a more just society. In other words, such perpetuation of oppression and/or injustice is
antifeminist.
In what follows, I will demonstrate that failure to respect trans identities perpetuates
transphobic oppression both directly and indirectly. That is, failure to respect trans identities is
itself an injustice and it motivates further injustices committed against trans people. Therefore, a
feminist account of “woman” that fails to respect trans identities perpetuates transphobic
oppression. Given that feminists ought to be committed to avoiding the perpetuation of
oppression and injustice, such failure to respect trans identities is in tension with feminists’
commitment to the eradication of women’s oppression.12
According to Bettcher in “Trans Identities and First-Person Authority,” denial of trans
identities is a violation of ethical first person authority and is therefore unjust. Bettcher begins by
It should be noted that the reason that I argue for inclusion of trans women in a feminist account of “woman” is
because lack of recognition as women contributes to the oppression of trans women and is therefore in tension with
feminist aims. Such a strategy would not apply to, say, black men, whose oppression is not intensified by their
exclusion from the category “woman.” While feminists’ commitment to ending oppression requires that feminists
avoid perpetuating the oppression of black men, excluding black men from the category “woman” does not
contribute to their oppression. Therefore, there is no imperative to include black men in a feminist account of
“woman.”
12
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proposing an ethical notion of first person authority that is meant to extend beyond the epistemic
notion. According to Bettcher, we have ethical first person authority (hereafter, FPA) over our
mental attitudes. We can be held responsible for our attitudes in the sense that we “can be faulted
for holding inappropriate, false, or irrational attitudes.”13 In other words, disclosure of our
attitudes can have social consequences. Because of this culpability for our mental attitudes,
Bettcher claims that the ethical notion of FPA entails that individuals have a right to privacy and
ownership of their attitudes.14 Consequently, disclosure of one’s attitudes ought not be coerced,
nor should a person “avow somebody else’s mental attitudes on their own behalf.”15
Bettcher claims “existential self-identity” falls under ethical FPA and that gender is part
of one’s existential self-identity.16 Bettcher claims that existential self-identity is not a
conception of the self but is instead determined by the set of beliefs, attitudes, and commitments
that one has. Because existential self-identity concerns one’s beliefs, attitudes, and commitments,
it “falls under the reach of FPA.” 17 On Bettcher’s account, gender is properly part of one’s
existential self-identity and therefore ought to be protected by ethical FPA. Bettcher provides
three reasons why gender is properly understood as part of one’s existential self-identity. First,
within trans-friendly communities, one’s gender self-identification does not invalidate others’,

Talia Mae Bettcher, “Trans Identities and First-Person Authority,” in “You’ve Changed”: Sex Reassignment and
Personal Identity, Laurie Shrage, ed. Oxford: Oxford UP (2009): 102.
14
One might object that we can be responsible for something without having a right to privacy with regard to that
thing. For example, one may be responsible for their testimony in court without having a right to privacy with regard
to what one witnessed. However, with attitudes and beliefs that are not acted upon and therefore do not directly
impact other people, it seems that the right to privacy might still apply. FPA’s right to privacy regarding attitudes
and beliefs is more akin to the right to privacy regarding which candidate we vote for.
15
Ibid., 102.
16
Bettcher explains the concept of existential self-identity by contrasting it with metaphysical self-identity.
According to Bettcher, metaphysical self-identity is “a self-conception that answers the question ‘What am I?’ It
involves an overall picture of the world (including categories such as men and women) in which one locates
oneself” (110). In contrast, existential self-identity answers the questions “What am I about? What moves me? What
do I stand for? What do I care about the most?” (110).
17
Ibid., 110.
13
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even if they hold different and/or conflicting metaphysical views about gender and sex.18 If
gender was understood as constituting part of one’s metaphysical self-identity, some individuals’
gender self-identifications would inevitably invalidate others’ if they held conflicting
metaphysical views about gender and sex. Second, when one self-identifies as a particular
gender, one is not making a claim about metaphysical reality but rather about one’s beliefs.19
Bettcher illuminates this point with an example: “For example, if one believes some neurological
state makes one a woman and it turns out one lacks this state, it follows one is not a women.
However, it is generally assumed in community interactions that the truth or falsity of a person’s
self-identifying claim does not stand or fall on such issues.”20 Third, existential self-identity
helps us understand individuals’ motivations for self-identifying in a certain way, whereas
metaphysical self-identity does not.21
Because gender is part of an individual’s existential self-identity and existential selfidentity falls under ethical FPA, it follows that individuals have FPA over their gender selfidentifications. Recall that, according to Bettcher, under the ethical notion of FPA individuals
have a right to privacy and ownership of their mental attitudes. This privacy and ownership
entails that it is morally impermissible to coerce someone into revealing one’s attitudes and it is
also morally impermissible to make avowals about another’s attitudes on their behalf. When
applied to gender, FPA entails that one cannot be forced to reveal one’s gender to others nor can
a person assume the authority of determining the truth of another’s gender identity. According to
Bettcher, failing to respect trans identities is a case of the latter violation of FPA.

18

Ibid., 111.
Ibid., 111.
20
Ibid., 111.
21
Ibid., 111.
19
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According to Bettcher, the “natural attitude” regarding conceptions of sex and gender
holds that “there are two naturally mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and invariant sexes, and
membership within a sex is determined by genitalia.”22 Bettcher claims that “normals” (those
who hold the natural attitude) do not respect trans self-identifications because they think that
“real” gender is inevitably determined by genitalia. In such cases, “normals” violate trans
people’s FPA over gender because they take their own metaphysical conception of sex as
determinative of the trans person’s “authentic” gender. In other words, such denials of trans
identities is a case of one person making definitive and authoritative claims about another
person’s mental attitudes on their behalf, which is a morally impermissible violation of FPA. But
denial of trans identities is more serious than a simple case of a controlling person asserting
authority over another’s mental attitudes. In contrast, when a trans person’s identity is denied,
the trans person is not given any opportunity to make a genuine avowal. That is, no matter what
the trans person claims regarding his or her gender, the denier has already determined the trans
person’s “real” gender based on her assessment of the trans person’s “natural” genital status. In
other words, if a trans woman claims “I am a woman,” this is interpreted as a lie or as pretense.
When trans identities are denied, it “silences a transperson’s avowal of existential selfidentity.”23
Failure to respect trans identities contributes to trans oppression by motivating sexual
violence and physical violence as well as by legitimating victim blaming in cases of transphobic
violence. In addition the risk of violence, when coupled with common assumptions about the
illegitimacy of trans identities, creates double binds for trans people. Bettcher argues that one
form of trans oppression is what she terms “reality enforcement,” which is motivated by

22
23

Bettcher, “Trans Identities,” 103.
Bettcher, “Trans Identities,” 115.
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assumptions about the illegitimacy of trans identities.24 According to Bettcher, reality
enforcement has four essential features. First, identity invalidation occurs when a trans person’s
gender identity is “erased”—that is, when an individual categorizes a trans woman as a man (for
example). Second, according to Bettcher, identity invalidation is asserted in terms of an
appearance-reality contrast—for example, the onlooker will say something like “that’s really a
man disguised as a woman.” Third, knowledge of this appearance-reality contrast presents trans
people with a double bind. That is, they can either pass as cis and risk being exposed as a
deceiver or they can be openly trans and be treated as a pretender. Finally, reality enforcement
involves some form of genital verification either through physical exposure or through comments
that assert the “reality” of a trans person’s genital status.25
Although Bettcher does not explicitly defend her claim that reality enforcement is a form
of trans oppression, her discussion of the phenomenon includes the necessary features for reality
enforcement to constitute a form of oppression. Here I will draw on Bettcher’s comments to
assert that reality enforcement is oppressive because it involves or threatens to involve sexual
violence, physical violence, victim blaming, and double binds.
First, reality enforcement can paradigmatically involve sexual violence. There are two
main ways that sexual violence is often involved in reality enforcement. First, trans people are
often raped as a result of the discovery that they are trans. Bettcher interprets rape of FTMs “as
an obvious strategy for putting ‘women back in their rightful place.’”26 Similarly, MTFs are
often subject to sexual violence in the form of rape. Second, as Bettcher notes, genital
verification is one of the essential features of identity enforcement. Genital verification can occur

Bettcher, “Trapped,” 392, 403. In “Evil Deceivers” Bettcher refers to the same phenomenon as “identity
enforcement” (47).
25
Bettcher, “Trapped,” 392.
26
Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers,” 57.
24
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either through forced physical exposure or through non-euphemistic statements about the genital
status of the victim. When genital verification takes the form of forced physical exposure, this is
a form of sexual violence.
Second, reality enforcement often involves physical violence against trans people.
Transphobic violence can be motivated by either the deceiver stereotype or the pretender
stereotype. For those who are openly trans and are thus interpreted as “an x pretending to be a y,”
they may be subjected to violence because they are interpreted as violating gender norms: “If a
person is subjected to discrimination or violence because this person is taken to be in violation of
gender norms (perhaps because the person is wearing a dress), this is no doubt because the
person is being transphobically viewed as a man.”27 In contrast, trans people who attempt to pass
as cis are often viewed as malicious deceivers upon discovery and are often subjected to brutal
violence as a form of retaliation for the deception.
Third, in cases of transphobic violence, the acts of the perpetrator are often justified or
minimized by use of victim blaming. Specifically, the trans panic defense has been used in court
as a defense against hate crime charges for individuals who murdered trans people.28 The trans
panic defense often appeals to the sexual deception that the trans victim engaged in and,
according to Bettcher, this sexual deception is often equated with rape.29 Consequently, the
violence and consequent murder of the trans “deceiver” is interpreted as a violent and enraged
response to the shock of discovering that the perpetrator has been deceived by the trans victim.
Finally, as I mentioned above, one of the essential features of reality enforcement is the
double bind that trans people face. That is, trans people face the deceiver-pretender double bind
in which they must choose between having their gender identity taken seriously and minimizing
Bettcher, “Trapped,” 396.
Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers,” 42-45.
29
Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers,” 52-54.
27
28
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the risk of lethal violence. This double bind is characteristically oppressive insofar as it limits
trans people’s options to two unsavory choices.30
All of these paradigmatic features of reality enforcement are motivated by a belief that
trans identities are illegitimate. Consequently, failure to respect trans identities contributes to
trans oppression in the forms of double binds, sexual violence, physical violence, and victim
blaming. Thus, failure to respect trans identities is in tension with feminists’ implicit
commitment to avoid perpetuating oppression and is therefore anti-feminist.
Insofar as feminism is necessarily embedded within a broader condemnation of
oppression and injustice, it runs counter to the aims and commitments of feminists to perpetuate
oppression, particularly oppression that is based on gender or gender identity. Failure to respect
trans identities often underlies transphobic violence, which is a form of oppression.31 Thus, it
seems that there is, in fact, a strong imperative for a feminist analysis of gender to respect the
gender identities of trans people by developing a trans-inclusive definition of woman.
3.2

Common Sources of Sexism and Transphobia
As I claimed above, one of the aims of feminism is to eradicate the oppression of women.

Here, I argue that failing to respect trans identities contributes to the oppression of women.
Consequently, an account of “woman” that excludes (non-passing) trans women is in tension
with this aim of feminism. Specifically, failure to respect trans identities supports a cultural
assumption that motivates and is used to justify sexual violence against women. A feminist
account of “woman” that excludes (non-passing) trans women fails to respect trans identities.

See: Marilyn Frye, “Oppression,” in The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, by Marilyn Frye,
Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press (1983): 2-3.
31
Systematic violence is one of the forms of oppression that Young discusses in her “Five Faces.” Iris Marion
Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990):
61-63.
30
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Therefore, it is crucial to the aims of feminism that a feminist account of “woman” be transinclusive.
According to Bettcher, gender presentation is taken to communicate genital status. I
would like to suggest, further, that gender presentation more broadly communicates sexual
availability. Specifically, female gender presentation is taken to communicate sexual availability
for men—where sexual availability for men includes female genitalia and a heterosexual interest
in sex with men. Bettcher argues that the communicative connection between gender
presentation and genital status underlies the trans panic defense (which has been used to defend
perpetrators of transphobic violence). She compares the denial of authenticity at work in the
trans panic defense to the denial of authenticity that is employed in shifting blame to victims of
sexual violence. Here, I want to suggest that the communicative connection between gender
presentation and sexual availability both motivates and is used to justify sexual violence against
women as well as transphobic violence.
When a woman adopts a feminine gender presentation, she is taken to be communicating
her sexual availability—she is communicating female genital status but, more importantly, she is
taken to be communicating an interest in sex with men. Marilyn Frye expresses this idea in the
following:
It is a sort of implicit theory of women’s sexuality according to which a woman who
largely adheres to patriarchal feminine norms in act and attitude and who does not
radically challenge or rebel against patriarchal institutions is heterosexual, and a woman
who does not comply with feminine norms or who seriously challenges or rebels against
patriarchal institutions is a lesbian.32
When a woman refuses a man’s sexual advances, the assumption that her gender presentation is
communicative can be invoked and used to undermine her verbal expression of disinterest. That

Marilyn Frye, “Willful Virgin or Do You Have to Be a Lesbian to Be a Feminist?,” in Willful Virgin: Essays in
Feminism 1976-1992, by Marilyn Frye, Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press (1992): 127-28.
32
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is, in some cases, gender presentation overrules a woman’s expressed disinterest in sex. In this
way, the communicative connection between gender presentation and sexual availability
motivates sexual violence against women by undermining the authority of women’s verbal
refusals of sexual advances. Further, in cases where a woman has been a victim of sexual
violence, blame is often shifted to the victim by alluding to the victim’s attire. Specifically,
remarks are often made about the victim’s attire, suggesting that, by her gender presentation,
“she was asking for it.” In this way, the communicative connection between gender presentation
and sexual availability is used to justify sexual violence against women.
Similarly, Bettcher claims that much transphobic violence is motivated and justified by
the idea that trans victims “deceive” their assailants by presenting a gender that does not align
with the genital status that they were assigned at birth.33 That is, trans women in particular are
often subjected to violence that is motivated by the assailant’s anger at discovering that the
woman he was sexually interested in (or intimate with) is “really a man.” Underlying this
violence is an assumption that trans identities are illegitimate or false. In this way, the
communicative connection between gender presentation and sexual availability motivates
transphobic violence. Additionally, the assumed illegitimacy of trans identities is used to defend
perpetrators of transphobic violence. Again, blame is shifted to the victim because it is asserted
that the victim has misrepresented her “true” identity by presenting as a woman when her genital
status at birth is thought to make her “really a man.” In this way, the communicative connection
between gender presentation and sexual availability is used to justify transphobic violence.
Insofar as the same cultural assumption about the communicative connection between
gender presentation and sexual availability motivates and is used to justify both transphobic
violence and sexual violence against women, anything that supports this cultural assumption also
33
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contributes to transphobic violence and sexual violence against women. Failure to respect trans
identities supports this cultural assumption and therefore contributes to the oppressive forms of
violence against trans people and women. Failure to respect trans identities supports the notion
that trans people are deceivers because of the misalignment of their gender presentation and their
genitalia. In other words, failing to respect trans identities supports the identification of trans
people as deceivers because of their violation of the communicative connection between gender
presentation and sexual availability (specifically genital status). Because failure to respect trans
identities supports the communicative connection between gender presentation and genital status,
it contributes to transphobic violence and sexual violence against women. Insofar as sexual
violence against women (and women’s resultant fear of being subjected to such violence) is a
feature of women’s oppression, failure to respect trans identities contributes to the oppression of
women. Therefore, failure to respect trans identities conflicts with the feminist aim of eradicating
women’s oppression. Consequently, a feminist account of “woman” that fails to respect trans
identities by excluding (non-passing) trans women undermines the feminist commitment
combatting women’s oppression.
4

Feminist Discourse: Understanding Women’s Oppression
As stated above, feminist discourse is intended to advance our understanding of the

oppression that is faced by women as women. As Haslanger claims (and Jenkins seems to agree),
successful feminist discourse requires the use of a definition of “woman” that allows us to focus
our analysis on those individuals who are oppressed by sexual subordination: “For the purposes
of critical feminist inquiry, oppression is a significant fact around which we should organize our
theoretical categories; it may be that non-oppressed females are marginalized within my account,
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but that is because for the broader purposes at hand… they are not the ones that matter.”34 If it is
the case that non-passing trans women are oppressed as women, then an account of “woman”
that excludes them cannot successfully fulfill the purpose of feminist discourse
In what follows, I will demonstrate that non-passing trans women are oppressed as
women and, consequently, a definition of “woman” that is intended to serve the aims of feminist
discourse must include trans women. Because non-passing trans women are not perceived to be
women “regularly and for the most part,” I cannot rely on external sources of oppression to
prove that they are oppressed as women. In what follows, I will argue that non-passing trans
women are oppressed as women because they are sexually objectified as women in some senses.
First, I will suggest that, as women, trans women (both passing and non-passing) are subject to
indirect sexual objectification at the hands of cultural stereotypes that sexualize women, their
bodies, their appearances, and their actions. Then, I will draw on Sandra Bartky’s suggestion that
women can and do objectify themselves to argue that, like all other women, non-passing trans
women can be oppressed by their internalization of oppressive gender norms.
4.1

Accounts of Sexual Objectification
Objectification typically involves a failure to recognize the objectified individual as a

person and moral equal. That is, the victim of objectification is not recognized as an autonomous
individual with interests and desires of her own.35 Further, sexual objectification involves
viewing the objectified individual as an instrument for one’s own sexual pleasure, as Bartky
explains: “A person is sexually objectified when her sexual parts or sexual functions are
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separated out from the rest of her personality and reduced to the status of mere instruments or
else regarded as if they were capable of representing her.”36
Both Bartky and Cudd identify sexual objectification as a form of psychological
oppression. According to Bartky, psychological oppression necessarily involves a failure to
recognize the full personhood of the oppressed.37 Pervasive sexual objectification meets the
criteria for psychological oppression because it involves viewing members of certain groups as
less than full persons and, when victims of objectification internalize these views, objectification
in fact prevents its victims from exercising their full personhood.
Bartky rejects the notion that sexual harassment based on sexual objectification is merely
an expression of attraction or eroticism. Instead, Bartky suggests that sexual objectification
involves the employment of ideas and stereotypes about women’s social subordination and the
appropriateness of treating women as sexual objects:
While it is true that for these men I am nothing but, let us say, a ‘nice piece of ass,’ there
is more involved in this encounter than their mere fragmented perception of me. They
could, after all, have enjoyed me in silence… But I must be made to know that I am a
‘nice piece of ass’: I must be made to see myself as they see me… What I describe seems
less the spontaneous expression of a healthy eroticism than a ritual of subjugation.38
According to Bartky, sexual objectification plays an essential role in the social subordination of
women not simply because it involves viewing a woman as a mere object but because the victim
is often made aware of being viewed as a mere object.39 Sexual objectification of women is,
however, far more complex than isolated instances of individual women being objectified by
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individual men. Cudd and Bartky both argue that women as a group are systematically
objectified by the cultural emphasis on women’s appearance and the sexualization of women in
popular media:
Apart from directly objectifying actions, there is also a sense in which our culture
constantly, tacitly sexually objectifies women so commonly as to constitute direct,
cultural, psychological oppression. Women are sexually objectified in this indirect sense
when as a gender they are taken to be the representatives of sex and sexual passivity, for
example, when goods are marketed to them by displaying women as objects of
adornment or sexual pleasure, or through beauty pageants and pompon squads.40
Here Cudd illustrates the way that culture indirectly objectifies women by unquestioningly
representing women as sex objects whose purpose is to satisfy the sexual desires of men.
4.2

Sexually Objectifying Stereotypes
Women (both trans and cis) are objectified by sexually objectifying stereotypes that are

dominant in our society. Such objectifying stereotypes play a significant role in the social
subordination of women as a group. Even if non-passing trans women are not the victims of
isolated, individual instances of sexual objectification (which seems unlikely), one can still argue
that they are sexually objectified as women by attending to the ways that they are subject to
cultural sources of indirect sexual objectification.
Bettcher describes the sexualized stereotypes that are often applied to trans women but
not trans men: “it is not uncommon for mtfs to be viewed as sexually available and disposable
whores—a stereotype simply not applied to ftms.”41 What Bettcher here refers to as a stereotype
is not simply a stereotype but a sexually objectifying stereotype. The stereotype that trans women
are “sexually available and disposable whores” meets both the criteria of sexual objectification
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mentioned above—it fails to recognize a group of persons as autonomous moral agents with their
own wishes and desires and it treats the objectified individuals as instruments for (men’s) sexual
pleasure. Further, because this stereotype applies to trans women but not trans men, it is clear
that, while the stereotype is influenced by trans women’s intersecting identities, an element of
the stereotype is unique to the oppression of women generally. Thus, the stereotype that Bettcher
mentions demonstrates that trans women as a group are sexually objectified as women by
cultural sources.
Similarly, Julia Serano explains that trans women’s transitions are often sexualized
through the common assumption that the transitions are motivated by a desire to attract men:
“the assumption that we change our sex in order to attract men essentially sexualizes our motives
for transitioning, a move that disempowers trans women and femaleness while reinforcing the
idea that heterosexual male desire is central.”42 Serano connects this sexualization of trans
women’s transitions to the rampant sexualization of women generally in our society:
However, it’s a mistake for cissexual women to view depictions of trans women as
having little to do with themselves, as they are so obviously meant to dismiss both
transsexuality and femaleness. After all, in a world where women are regularly reduced
to objects of male desire, it’s no accident that trans women—the only people in our
society who actively choose to become women and who actively fight for their right to be
recognized as female—are almost universally depicted in a purely sexualized manner.43
Serano’s analysis of the connection between the sexualization of MTF transitions and the sexual
objectification of women generates compelling support for the claim that trans women (passing
and non-passing alike) are subject to indirect sexual objectification at the hands of cultural
sources in much the same way as women generally.
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4.3

Self-Objectification
As a result of systematic objectification, some women internalize their objectification,

such that they come to objectify themselves. Cudd discusses the way that women’s
internalization of sexual objectification can lead women to want to satisfy men’s (sexual) desires
without considering or at the expense of their own desires (sexual and otherwise): “The sexual
objectification of women involves taking women to have a nature that suits them to be objects
for the sexual pleasure of men, that is, to naturally desire to fulfill men’s wish that they become
subordinate to men, to fulfill men’s desires rather than to seek to know and fulfill their own.”44
Bartky focuses on a different aspect of women’s self-objectification—the reduction of women’s
identities to their bodies and physical appearance: “Subject to the evaluating eye of the male
connoisseur, women learn to evaluate themselves first and best. Our identities can no more be
kept separate from the appearance of our bodies than they can be kept separate from the shadowselves of the female stereotype.”45 According to Bartky, external sources objectify women so
pervasively that women themselves learn to objectify themselves by treating their physical
appearance as an essential determinant of their identity and worth.
I would like to suggest that, not only can trans women be susceptible to this form of
oppressive self-objectification but also that many trans women are victims of self-objectification
as women. Further, because this is an internalized form of oppression, it does not matter whether
or not the individual woman in question is classed as a woman by the surrounding members of
society. Rather, what matters in determining whether or not a particular woman is, in fact,
included among those who are harmed or potentially harmed by such self-objectification is
whether or not she takes herself to be the type of individual to whom the cultural expectations
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and stereotypes apply. In other words, what matters is whether or not the individual in question
identifies as a woman.46
Subject to the same societal identifications of women with their sexualized bodies, trans
women who want to present as women face the difficult double bind of wanting to present and
be recognized as the gender that they identify with in a society that intensely associates female
gender presentation with social subordination and sexual objectification. In other words, in
presenting as women, trans women adopt the norms of attire and behavior that commonly reduce
women to their bodies and sexual function. Serano suggests that the process by which trans
women come to internalize these norms is not unlike that of cis women:
despite being socialized male, those of us on the MTF spectrum have been exposed to
many of the same explicitly sexualizing cultural messages about womanhood and
femininity as those socialized female, and we are just as susceptible of constructing our
own sexualities and self-images around those very same cultural ideals.47
Specifically, the ideal image of female beauty is a slim, hairless, young woman who has large
(but not too large) “assets.” This image contains within it several different norms that might
govern a woman’s behavior in attempts to conform to the ideal: hairlessness, youth, and physical
fitness.
Not only are women not supposed to have facial hair, but the norms of feminine beauty
require the removal of body hair from the legs, armpits and pubis.48 Adherence to this norm
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requires extensive, regular (sometimes painful and expensive) hair removal. Women’s armpits,
legs, and pubis ought to be shaven, waxed, or sometimes even treated with laser hair removal.
But some women take this norm even further, removing hair from their chests, arms, stomachs,
feet, backs, and hands. Not only is this particular norm costly in terms of time, effort, money,
and pain, but it is also somewhat unachievable in that it requires women’s bodies to exhibit a
characteristic that is unnatural for adult women. In other words, this norm requires women to
constantly wage war against the natural process of hair growth, such that attempts to adhere to
this norm are never-ending.
A similarly unnatural norm contained within the image of female beauty is the emphasis
on youth. It seems that the ideally beautiful woman ought to appear to be in her twenties long
after that is physically possible. In order to achieve such results, women are advised by fashion
and beauty magazines to begin anti-aging regimens as early as their late twenties. Women are
sold countless creams, serums, and masks designed to fight the aging of their skin. Women are
expected to dye gray hairs. And, if one is desperate, brave, and/or wealthy enough, women can
undergo any of a number of expensive and painful procedures designed to give the appearance of
youth—including, but not limited to, face lifts, botox injections, and laser treatments.49
Further, the ideally beautiful woman also has a physique that is practically impossible to
achieve, both because it is internally contradictory and because it requires extreme dedication to
dieting and exercise, as Clare Chambers expresses quite clearly and succinctly: “most women
could never be as thin or as flat-stomached as the models they try to emulate… breasts that are
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both large and pert are somewhat oxymoronic.”50 Women are supposed to be slim but not too
muscular. Female bodies ought to be “soft” but not “fat.” Further, breasts and butts are supposed
to be round and perky, large but not too large. Such expectations of women’s bodies often
requires adherence to extreme forms of dieting and exercise—beyond what is required or even
suggested for maintaining a healthy lifestyle. Sometimes, attempts to conform to this norm
involve trips to a plastic surgeon—again a costly, painful, and dangerous measure.
Many women will assert that they conform to these norms not in order to be deemed
attractive to men but for their own personal comfort and satisfaction. One will often hear such
women say things like: “I do this for myself” or “I shave because that’s my preference.”
However, even if these women are not consciously trying to make themselves attractive to men
by conforming to these norms, they are nonetheless trying to achieve an ideal of female
attractiveness that advantages men and disadvantages women. In other words, such women have
simply internalized what society has set up as the ideal of female attractiveness, such that they
judge their own attractiveness according to an ideal of attractiveness that is based on male
preferences. Thus, we see that adherence to these sexualized norms of female appearance is
exemplary of Bartky’s self-objectification. These women have internalized the male gaze such
that, even if they are not trying to attract men by conforming to certain norms, that is the
standard by which they judge themselves.
Further, these norms are harmful. The harms are threefold. First, any efforts made to
conform to the norms will inevitably limit the freedom of the woman in question. Specifically,
trying to conform to sexualized gender norms is costly in terms of time, effort, money, and
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pain.51 Second, the ideals that many women aspire to achieve are typically unrealistic and
unachievable: “Real women are not beautiful when compared with the standards expected of
them.”52 Thus, a woman may feel a sense of inferiority due to her inability to perfectly conform
to the ideal image of feminine beauty. Finally, as Chambers notes, norms of feminine appearance
are harmful because of the role they play in marking women as inferior members of society: “the
problem with disciplinary appearance norms is not just that they are different for men and
women, and not just that they are more exacting and expensive (in both time and money) for
women, but that their effect is to cast women as inferior.”53
Given these details about the ways that self-objectification is built into norms of
femininity, we can understand how women come to sexually objectify themselves in attempting
to achieve norms of feminine beauty. What is important for my purposes, however, is that trans
woman (both passing and non-passing) can (and often do) take these norms to apply to
themselves. Consequently, if a trans woman takes these norms of femininity to apply to herself
she may come to sexually objectify herself in a way that is characteristic of women’s oppression.
5

Conclusion
I have argued that developing a trans-inclusive definition of gender is essential to

feminist aims—namely, understanding and combating women’s oppression. First, I argued that
the political aim of feminism—combatting women’s oppression—implicitly commits feminists
to bring about a more just society. Given that failing to respect trans identities is itself an
injustice and leads to further injustices against trans people, it is contrary to this broader
commitment of feminism for a feminist analysis of gender to marginalize trans women.
The issue here is not simply that conforming to these norms limits women’s freedom. Rather, the issue is that, in
conforming to these norms, women’s freedom is limited in an attempt to achieve an ideal that marks them as
subordinate and sexualized members of society.
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Additionally, given that sexist oppression and transphobic violence share some underlying
causes, a definition of “woman” that excludes some trans women may indirectly perpetuate the
oppression of women. Second, I argued that a trans-inclusive definition of “woman” is essential
to the success of feminist discourse. I proved that all trans women (both passing and nonpassing) can be oppressed as women through cultural stereotypes and internalized oppression
such that excluding them from feminist analysis would only hinder our understanding of
women’s oppression.
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